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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho 
LAW CLERK 
VERMONT TROTTER, ) 
) 
Plaintift~Appellont, ) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELL.ON, f7k/a ) 
BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEES FOR ) 
THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF ) 
CWALT,INC.,ALTERNATIVELOAN ) 
TRUST2005-28CB MORTGAGE PASS· ) 
THROUGH CERTIFICATES 2005-28CB; ) 
MORTGA TE ELECTRONIC ) 
REGISTRA TON SYSTEMS, INC.; ) 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
Supreme Court Docket No. 38022-2010 
Kootenai County District C.Ourt No. 
201().9S 
Ref. No. I 1-451 
The above entitled appeal is currently scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday, 
September 28, 20 I I, at 8:50 a.m. in Moscow, Idaho. Thereafter, a MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
RECORD with attachment was fi led by Appellant Vermont Trotter on September 6, 201 I, 
requesting this Couri for an Order augmenting the appellate record in the above entitled appeal with 
the documents attached to this Motion. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant Vermont Trotter's MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the Record in the above entitled 
appeal shall include the document listed below, a lile stamped copy of which accompanied this 
Motion: 
I. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion 10 Dismiss, ftle stamped 
May 12, 2010 . 
. ?~ 
DATED this \ day of September, 2011. 
AUGMENTATION RECORD By Order of the Supreme Coun 
cc: Counsel of Record 
In the Supreme Court of tl1e State of Idaho 
VERMONT TROTTER, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
V. ) 
) 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, f/k/a ) 
BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEES FOR ) 
THE CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF ) 
CWALT, INC., ALTERNATIVE LOAN ) 
TRUST 2005-28CB MORTGAGE PASS- ) 
THROUGH CERTIFICATES 2005-28CB; ) 
MORTGA TE ELECTRONIC ) 
REGISTRATON SYSTEMS, INC.; ) 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT RECORD 
Supreme c·ourt Docket No. 38022-2010 
Kootenai County District Court No. 
2010-95 
Ref. No. 11-451 
The above entitled appeal 1s currently scheduled for oral argument on Wednesday, 
September 28, 2011, at 8:50 a.m. in Moscow, Idaho. Thereafter, a MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
RECORD with attachment was filed by Appellant Vermont Trotter on September 6, 2011, 
requesting this Court for an Order augmenting the appellate record in the above entitled appeal with 
the documents attached to this Motion. Therefore, good cause appearing, 
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant Vermont Trotter's MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT RECORD be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the Record in the above entitled 
appeal shall include the document listed below, a file stamped copy of which accompanied this 
Motion: 
1. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, file stamped 
May 12, 2010. 
DATED this_\ __ day of September, 2011. 
cc: Counsel of Record 
By Order of the Supreme Court 
Stephen W. Kenyon, Qlerk 
I 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT RECORD - Docket No. 38022-2010 
MONICA FLOOD BRENNAN, P.C. 
Spokesman Review Building 
608 Northwest Boulevard, Suite 101 
Coeur D'Alene, ID 83814 
Tel: (208) 665-0088 
Fax: 208-676-8288 
Jeff Barnes, Esq. (admitted pro hac vice) 
W. J. Barnes, P.A. 
2G/Df,~Y 12 PM 2: sr 
Nevada office: c/o International Mediation Associates, Inc. 
6655 West Sahara Avenue, Suite B200 
Las Vegas, Nevada 89146 
Tel: (702) 222-3202 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IADHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI 
VERMONT TROTTER ) CIVIL NO: CV-2010-95 
) 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON F/K/A BANK ) 
OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR THE ) 
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWALT, INC. ) 
ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2005-28CB ) 
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES) 
SERIES 2005-28CB; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC) 
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; and ) 
RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A., ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF 
LAW IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Plaintiff VERMONT TROTTER, by and through his undersigned attorneys, files 
and serves his Response to the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants BANK OF NEW 
YORK MELLON F/K/A BANK OF NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR THE 
CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWALT, INC. ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2005-28CB 
MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2005-28CB (hereafter 
"BONY"); MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC. (hereafter 
"MERS"); and RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A. (hereafter "RC") and states: 
A. Background Facts and Procedural History 
1. Plaintiff VERMONT TROTTER instituted this action for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief against Defendants BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON F/K/A BANK OF 
NEW YORK AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATEHOLDERS OF CWALT, INC. 
ALTERNATIVE LOAN TRUST 2005-28CB MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH 
CERTIFICATES (hereafter "BONY"); MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION 
SYSTEMS, INC. (hereafter "MERS"); and RECONTRUST COMPANY, N.A. (hereafter 
"RC") challenging an attempt by these Defendants to foreclosure on the residential real 
property the subject of this action which is located at 512 South 14th Street, Coeur 
D'Alene, Idaho 83814 and is legally described as Lot 13 in Block 11 of Lakeshore 
Addition to Coeur D'Alene, according to the official plat thereof, filed in Book B of Plats 
at page 128, official records of Kootenai County, Idaho (hereafter the "Property"), which 
Property is the Plaintiff's primary residence. 
2. As set forth in the Complaint, the Appointment of Successor Trustee claims 
that Defendant BONY is the alleged "beneficiary", while the Notice of Trustee's Sale 
inconsistently claims that Defendant MERS is the alleged "beneficiary". 
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3. This Court has entered two separate Orders, those being on January 8, 
2010 and February 5, 2010, enjoining any foreclosure attempt or sale of the Property, 
doing so on February 5, 2010 after full legal argument on the issues raised as to the 
legal inability of the Defendants to pursue a foreclosure, which argument was 
entertained by this Court as to the factual allegations in the Complaint and the 
applicable decisional law which was cited to this Court on the record and which 
Plaintiff's counsel was thus made fully aware of at the February 5, 2010 hearing. 
4. Notwithstanding that this Court found that an injunction was proper based on 
the facts and the law cited and in fact based its decision on the Idaho and Nevada 
decisional law cited on the record at the hearing, Defendants have filed a "Motion to 
Dismiss" which totally fails to address the applicable law cited at the February 5, 2010 
hearing; which is grounded upon a fatally flawed premise; and which provides no basis 
whatsoever for dismissal or relief by "summary judgment'. 
5. Defendants' entire position is premised on an allegation that MERS was 
authorized to execute an Assignment of Deed of Trust For the reasons articulated on 
the record at the February 5·, 2010 hearing including the applicable law as to MERS 
which Defendants' counsel was made fully aware of on that date and as set forth again 
herein, Defendants' position is totally without merit and their Motion has been 
interposed for no other purpose than to delay these proceedings and frustrate the 
prosecution of this action. Defendants' Motion should thus be denied. 
B. Applicable Law and Argument 
6. As this Court specifically found at the February 5, 2010 hearing after full 
argument, Idaho courts have spoken extensively on the alleged authority of MERS to do 
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anything, and have uniformly, along with other jurisdictions, rejected the authority of 
MERS to undertake any action to institute or further a foreclosure including any 
purported assignment of either the Note or the Deed of Trust from the original lender to 
any third party, which would include Defendant BONY herein. 
7. As set forth on the record at the February 5, 2010 hearing, the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Idaho, in two separate opinions, rejected the alleged 
authority of MERS. The first was the matter of In Re Sheridan, Case No. 08-20381-TLM 
(Opinion issued March 12, 2009). In analyzing the real party in interest requirements 
and the alleged "beneficiary" status of MERS in the Deed of Trust, the Sheridan court 
expressly rejected MERS' self-appointed designation as "beneficiary" in view of its 
declared status of "solely as nominee", and found that the securitized mortgage loan 
trust and its "trustee" had no interest in the Note or the Deed of Trust. The Court also 
found that there was no language in the Note giving MERS any rights whatsoever. The 
Court found that there were disputed factual issues as to who was the holder of the 
Note. 
8. These same disputed issues of material fact are present in this case and thus 
a request for summary judgment is specious at best. The foreclosing party is a Wall 
Street bank which claims to be an alleged "Trustee" of a securitized mortgage loan trust, 
which is not the original lender. The Appointment of Successor Trustee and the Notice 
of Trustee Sale identify different alleged "beneficiaries", none of which is the original 
lender. The only purported authority of the "trustee" Wall Street Bank to do anything is 
the legally voi'd and infirm MERS assignment, which is defective as a matter of law as it 
4 
does not and cannot assign the Note or the Deed of Trust. It is without dispute that 
Defendant RC has no interest in either the Note or the Deed of Trust. 
9. The Idaho Bankruptcy Court went further in addressing the infirmities as to 
MERS in the matter of In Re Wilhelm, Case No. 08-20577-TLM (opinion issued July 7, 
2009), which was also brought to the attention of this Court and Defendants' counsel at 
the February 5, 2010 hearing. In Wilhelm (as here), the Deeds of Trust named MERS 
as the alleged "beneficiary", but also stated that MERS was "solely as nominee" and 
that MERS held "only legal title". The Court found that the Deeds of Trust did not state 
that MERS was authorized to transfer the promissory notes, but that nevertheless the 
movants in four of the five cases discussed in the opinion submitted assignments in 
which MERS purported to assign the Deed of Trust "together with" the note. 
· 10. In again rejecting the alleged authority of MERS, the Wilhelm court noted 
that the moving parties "seem to presume that the assignments, standing alone, entitle 
them to enforce the underlying notes". The Court found this assumption to be 
"unfounded", as the "nominal beneficiary" language in the Deeds of Trust did not, "either 
expressly or by implication", authorize MERS to transfer the promissory notes. 
11. The Wilhelm Court cited to the cases of Saxon Mortgage Services v. Hillery, 
2008 WL 5170180 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2008) and Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 
2009 WL 531057 (Mo. Ct. App. March 3, 2009) in support of its position. These cases, 
as well as the Wilhelm decision, are cited hereinbelow in the discussion concerning the 
analysis of MERS by numerous courts throughout the United States which, like 
Sheridan and Wilhelm, have uniformly and consistently rejected MERS' purported 
authority to do anything. 
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12. The findings by the Court in Sheridan and Wilhelm represent the current 
state of the law in Idaho as to the lack of authority on the part of MERS, as recognized 
by this Court in its entry of the injunction after a full hearing. Significantly, the 
conclusions in Sheridan and Wilhelm are not isolated, but reflect the current state of the 
law nationally as to MERS set forth below. 
13. In order to understand what MERS is and what it is not, it is helpful to first 
examine the structure of MERS as defined by the Supreme Courts of Kansas and 
Nebraska and the Court of Appeals of New York (New York's highest court): 
MERS is a private corporation that administers the MERS System, a national 
electronic registry that tracks the transfer of ownership interests and servicing 
rights in mortgage loans. Through the MERS system, MERS becomes the 
Mortgagee of record for participating members through assignment of the 
Member's interests to MERS. MERS is listed as the grantee in the otncial 
records maintained at country register of deeds offices. The lenders retain 
the promissory notes, as well as the se,vicing rights to the mortgages. The 
lenders can then sell these interests to investors without having to record 
the transaction in the public record. MERS is compensated for its services 
through fees charged to participating members. 
Landmark Nat. Bank v. Kessler, 216 P.3d '58, 164 (Kan. 2009)(emphasis supplied), 
citing Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Nebraska Dept. of Banking & 
Finance, 704 N.W.2d 784, 785 (Neb. 2005)(where MERS disclaimed a position in order 
to avoid registering as a business entity and thus having to pay fees). 
In 1993, members of the real estate mortgage industry created MERS, an 
electronic registration system for mortgages. Its purpose is to streamline the 
mortgage process by eliminating the need to prepare and record paper 
assignments of mortgage, as had been done for hundreds of years. To 
accomplish this goal, MERS acts as nominee and as mortgagee of record 
for its members nationwide and appoints itself nominee, as mortgagee, 
for its members' successors and assigns, thereby remaining nominal 
mortgagee of record no matter how many times loan servicing, or the 
mortgage itself, may be transferred. MERS hopes to register every 
residential and commercial home loan nationwide on its electronic system. 
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Merscorp, inc. v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 86 {N.Y. 2006). 
14. In analyzing this defined role of MERS against the standard MERS language 
in a mortgage document, the Superior Court of Rutland, Vermont in the matter of 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Johnston, Docket No. 420-6-09-Rdcv 
(2009), conducted a thorough examination of the current law as to MERS, first 
examining the definition of "nominee" from Black's Law Dictionary, 1076 {8th Edition! 
2004) as being "a person designated to act in place of another in a very limited way" 
and as "a party who holds bare legal title for the benefit of others and distributes funds 
for the benefit of others". Legal title is defined as "a title that evidences apparent 
ownership but does not necessarily signify full and complete title or a beneficial 
interest", Black's Law Dictionary at 1523. This is in contrast to "equitable title", which is 
"a title that indicates a beneficial interest in property and gives the holder the right to 
acquire formal legal title". 
15. The Vermont court held that the mortgage deed consistently referred to 
MERS "solely as a nominee" and that it holds "only legal title", but it then purported to 
expand MERS' authority as a "nominee" to act as in essence an agent or power-of-
attorney to carry out the rights of the lender, including foreclosure and sale of the 
property. The court held that this purported expansion of authority was restricted to that 
"necessary to comply with law or customn, and that, importantly, MERS and the lender 
purposely chose to use the specific legal term "nominee" and not "agent" or "power of 
attorney", and that MERS chose to define the term "nominee". The court further noted 
that the mortgage deed consistently referred to the Lender's rights to the property, and 
7 
nui i-..1C::KS', which was consistent with MERS limited authority to act "solely as 
nominee". 
16. Against this backdrop of established decisional law and admissions of 
MERS, the Vermont court held that MERS could not enforce the underlying obligation, 
and may not enforce the mortgage deed it holds in its name with only "bare legal title". 
The fact that the Defendants herein have acknowledged the presence of this same 
MERS language in the Deed of Trust the subject of this action results in MERS being 
subject to the same caveats as set forth in the body of decisional law set forth herein. 
17. The Vermont court examined the Nebraska decision where affirmative 
representations were made by MERS that: 
(a) it does not acquire mortgage loans because it only holds bare legal title in a 
nominee capacity; 
(b) it is contractually prohibited from exercising any rights with respect to the 
mortgages, i.e. foreclosure, without the authorization of its members; 
(c) it does not own the promissory notes secured by the mortgages and has no 
rights to payments on the notes; and 
(d) it does not take applications, underwrite loans, make decisions on whether 
to extend credit, collect mortgage payments, hold escrows for taxes and insurance, or 
provide any loan servicing functions whatsoever. MERS merely tracks the ownership of 
the lien and is paid for its services through membership fees charged to its members, 
concluding that MERS does not acquire "any loan or extension of credit secured by a 
lien on real property", and that MERS "does not itself extend credit or acquire rights to 
receive payments on mortgage loans; that the lenders retain the promissory notes and 
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servicing rights to the mortgage, while MERS acqu;res legal tWe to the mortgage for 
recordation purposes." 
18. The Vermont court went on to note that counsel for MERS in the Kansas 
decision "explicitly declined to demonstrate to the trial court a tangible interest in the 
mortgage", citing the case at 216 P.3d at 167, and that the Kansas court found that 
MERS had no stake in the outcome of an independent action for foreclosure, as it did 
not lend money, nor was anyone involved in the case required to pay MERS any 
money. The Kansas court concluded by holding that "If MERS is only the mortgagee, 
without ownership of the mortgage instrument, it does not have an enforceable right", 
adding that while the note is essential, the mortgage itself is only "an incident" to the 
note. 
19. The Vermont court, expounding further on the holding of the Kansas 
decision which itself noted what MERS argued to the Nebraska Supreme Court, found 
that MERS was not authorized engage in practices that it would make it a party to either 
the enforcement of mortgages or the transfer of mortgages. The Vermont court also 
noted that MERS and the lender intentionally split the obligation and the mortgage 
deed, and held that MERS lacked standing to bring a foreclosure action in its own 
name, or as "nominee" on behalf of the lender. 
20. The Court of Common Pleas for the State of South Carolina in the matter of 
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. v. Girdvainis, Civil Action No. 2005-CP-
43-0278 (Jan. 20, 2006) also held MERS to its representations previously made to the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska as to its non-ownership of the promissory notes; not 
extending any credit; not having any independent right to collect on any debt because 
9 
Ml::KS d1d~ not extend any credit and that the mortgage debtor does not owe MERS any -
money; etc. and held that since MERS prevailed in the Nebraska litigation, MERS was 
"judicially estopped to disavow the positions it advanced during the litigation process in 
Nebraska or avoid the findings and conclusions articulated by the Nebraska court." 
21. The South Carolina court, citing the caveat on MERS' authority by MERS' 
own contract, held that the representation as to the assignment of the note and 
mortgage to MERS "for valuable consideration" was "diametrically opposed to the 
way MERS operates". The operative language in the MERS contract to which the 
Girdvainis court refers is that within MERS' own contract which it has with its lenders 
and servicers, which specifically limits MERS' authority as to mortgage loans and 
properties the subject thereof: 
MERS shall have no rights whatsoever as to any payments made on account of 
such mortgage loans, to any servicing rights related to such mortgage loans, or any 
mortgaged properties securing such mortgage loans. MERS agrees not to assert any 
rights with respect to such mortgage loans or mortgaged properties. 
22. The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada in the matter 
of In re Joshua and Stephanie Mitchell, Case No. BK-S-07-16226-LBR (Decision of 
August 19, 2008), in analyzing what MERS stated it was according to its own website; 
the testimony of the Secretary of MERS; and the definition of "beneficiary" from Black's 
Law Dictionary 165 (8th Edition 2004, the same as that used by the Vermont Court), 
held that "MERS is not a beneficiary as it had no rights whatsoever to any payments, 
to any servicing rights, or to any of the properties secured by the loans." (emphasis 
supplied) The Court cited the same MERS "Terms and Conditions" set forth above in 
the MERS v. Girdvainis decision from 2006. 
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23. Thus and in view of the overwhelming weight of this now established 
decisional law, Defendants' assertion herein that MERS has some alleged authority to 
do anything, include "assign" the Deed of Trust, is essentially specious. Defendants' 
argument violates the very caveats of MERS' own contract; is vitiated by the holdings in 
two separate Idaho Federal opinions; and Defendants' assertion of what MERS is 
purportedly permitted to do is "diametrically opposite" of what MERS purports to be, as 
affirmatively represented to and found by the Courts of Nebraska (Supreme Court}, 
Kansas (Supreme Court), New York (Court of Appeals), Vermont, South Carolina, and 
Nevada (Federal). However, the law as to what MERS is not and cannot do does not 
end there. 
24. In addition to holding that MERS has no rights to the mortgage instrument, 
numerous Courts of the United States have also held that MERS has no rights to the 
promissory notes and no authority to transfer same. As a foreclosure requires unity of 
ownership, by the same party, of both the note and the (incident) mortgage instrument, 
MERS' legal inability to transfer the Note further precludes it from instituting or furthering 
a foreclosure. 
25. The court in the matter of Landmark National Bank v. Kessler, 216 P.3d 158, 
289 Kan. 528 (Kan. 2009), held that "a nominee of the owner of a note and mortgage 
may not effectively assign the note and mortgage to another for want of an ownership 
interest in said note and mortgage by the nominee", and that as MERS never held the 
promissory note, its assignment of the deed of trust to a third party separate from the 
note had no force, citing Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 S.W.3d 619, 623 
(Mo.App. 2009). 
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Lv~ Siyn1Lt;antly, tne Kansas Supreme L;ourt also cited In Re Wilhelm, 4u7 b.K. 
392 (Bankr.D.ldaho 2009, cited hereinabove) for its holding that the "standard note 
language does not expressly or implicitly authorize MERS to transfer the note", and the 
decision in Saxon Mortgage Services v. Hillery, 2008 WL 5170180 (N.D.Cal. 2008) as 
holding "for there to be a valid assignment, there must be more than just assignment of 
the deed alone; the note must also be assigned ... MERS purportedly assigned both the 
deed of trust and the promissory note ... however, there is no evidence of record that 
establishes that EMRS either held the promissory note or was given the authority ... to 
assign the note". 
27. The Supreme Court of Arkansas in the matter of Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. v. Southwest Homes of Arkansas. Inc., 2009 WL 723182 
(Ark. 2009) found that the deed of trust provided that all payments were to be made to 
the lender; that the lender made all decisions on late payments; no payments on the 
underlying debt were made to MERS; and MERS did not service the loan in any way as 
it did not oversee payments or administration of the loan in any way. MERS asserted to 
be a corporation providing electronic tracking of ownership interests in residential real 
property security instruments. 
28. MERS argued in the Arkansas case that it held a property interest through 
holding legal title with respect to the rights conveyed to the borrower by the lender. The 
Court's response: "We disagree". The Court found that title was conveyed to the trustee; 
that the deed of trust did not convey title to MERS; and that as such, MERS was not the 
"beneficiary" even though it is so designated in the deed of trust. The Court held 
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that the iender on the deed of rrust was th·e bGnefic,ary~ as 1( 1 et;eiveu payments on the 
debt secured by the property. 
29. Similarly here, MERS is not the trustee; MERS did not receive any 
payments; and thus MERS is not the "beneficiary" despite what Defendants claim. The 
law cited above is clear and consistent that the "person for whose benefit a trust deed is 
given" is the lender, not MERS. 
30. As set forth above, the Kansas decision in Landmark cited (as did the 
Wilhelm decision from Idaho) the case of Bellistri v. Ocwen, 284 S.W. 3d 619 
(Mo.App.E.D. 2009). That case held that the record reflected no evidence "that MERS 
held the promissory note or that the original lender gave MERS the authority to transfer 
the promissory note. MERS could not transfer the promissory note; therefore the 
language in the assignment of the deed of trust purporting to transfer the promissory 
note was ineffective", citing Black v. Adrian, 80 S.W.3d 909, 914-915 
(Mo.App.S. D.2002). 
31. As set forth hereinabove, the Idaho Federal Bankruptcy Court in In Re 
Wilhelm (cited above) similarly held, finding that although the deeds of trust named 
MERS as the "nominal beneficiary", this language did not, either expressly or by 
implication, authorize MERS to transfer the promissory notes. Without any transfer of 
the Notes, there was no interest in the Note by the party seeking to pursue a foreclosure 
through a MERS assignment. 
32. Defendants completely ignore this wealth of recent decisional law, including 
that from the state of Idaho, with its consistent findings and holdings nullifying any 
alleged authority of MERS to do anything other than electronically track mortgage loans, 
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which law c"6mplete1y' vfffales ·the entirety of Defendants' positions as to !VIERS and 
completely destroys the very foundation of Defendants' assertions. In view of this wealth 
of authority, Defendants' arguments should be rejected and its Motion denied in its 
entirety, whether couched as a Motion to Dismiss or as a request for summary 
judgment. 
33. Defendants' entire premise rests on the unfounded (and legally incorrect) 
assumption that MERS assigned the Deed of Trust and that simply because "MERS 
role was fully disclosed" that the alleged Assignment was legally proper. As this Court 
recognized at the prior hearing and has been established by the consistent case law 
nationally including the law from Idaho, Defendants' assertions are not only unfounded, 
but have been expressly rejected on the law not only in Idaho but by a multitude of 
jurisdictions, both state and Federal, across the United States, with several of these 
jurisdictions relying in part for their decisions on the findings of the Idaho Federal 
Bankruptcy Court in the Wilhelm. 
34. As such, whether Defendants allegedly "complied with" the Idaho foreclosure 
procedure is irrelevant to the inquiry and issues raised by the Complaint. The real issue, 
which Defendants ignored at the last hearing and continue to ignore, is whether they 
had any alleged authority to even undertake actions toward foreclosure, which the 
decisional law of Idaho and numerous jurisdictions throughout the United States have 
uniformly held that they cannot as a matter of law. 
C. Plaintiff Has the Right to Seek a Declaration as to the Foreclosure Controversy 
35. As set forth in the Complaint and Affidavit, Plaintiff has no idea of how any of 
the Defendants came into any ownership interest of his mortgage loan. Although MERS 
14 
is mentioned In the Deed of Trust, rt is not the beneficiary and 1s"n6t mentioned in the 
Note, and there is no evidence that the original lender ever gave MERS either rights to 
the Note or rights to transfer the note to MERS. As such, Plaintiff is entitled to seek a 
declaration as to his rights under the Note and Deed of Trust. 
36. Significantly, Defendants have made no complaint that Plaintiff did not plead 
all of the elements to state a cause of action for either Declaratory or Injunctive Relief, 
which Plaintiff has in fact done in requesting Injunctive Relief pursuant to Idaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure 65, and in requesting Declaratory Relief pursuant to Idaho Statutes 
Tiele 10, Chapter 12, sections 10-1202 et seq. 
37. Defendants have raised nothing more than disagreement with the facts 
plead while ignoring the real significant disputed issues of material facts raised by the 
Complaint and Exhibits thereto. What Defendants' Motion does is simply reaffirm that 
there are disputed issues of material fact which require that this matter advance to full 
jury trial as demanded in the Complaint. 
38. Further, and perhaps even more significantly, Defendants have failed to 
even address the matters of credit enhancements, insurances, and applicable setoffs to 
the claimed amount due as set forth in paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Complaint. Plaintiff 
thus asserts that the Defendants have thus admitted the truth of these matters, leaving 
only, for discovery, the issues of whether Defendant BONY was paid 100, 200, or more 
percent on the loan and is thus attempting to be paid a third time by foreclosing. 
Alternatively, should this Court determine that the Defendants have disputed these 
material facts, same remain as issues to be litigated at the trial of this cause. 
D. Conclusion 
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30. B:_~er~dai .~;;' i:..,:c;t;. ~ prer.-1is~ rests on a legally flawed and void pur._:,.:>rted 
grant of authority from Defendant MERS. Defendants' entire position has been rejected 
by Idaho law and the law of numerous other jurisdictions. 
40. Defendants have done nothing more than to raise disputed issues of 
material fact which must be resolved at trial. 
41. Defendants' Motion provides no grounds for dismissal or any other 
dispositive relief, and should be denied in its entirety. 
42. Plaintiff requests that he be awarded his attorneys' fees in connection with 
defending the Defendants' Motion should this Court deem same appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court deny the 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for the reasons set forth herein, and for any other and 
further relief which is just and proper. 
Dated this 12th day of May, 2010. 
Jeff Barnes, Esq. 
Admitted pro hac vice 
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